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Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: HIPAA’s Effect on Informal 
Discovery in Products Liability and  
Personal Injury Cases 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With the passage of the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA),1 personally identifiable health 
information was subjected to a regulatory scheme that was stricter in 
most jurisdictions than previous regulations. To the average person, 
this was manifest through an increase in the number of signatures 
requested by physicians and pharmacists. Practicing attorneys, 
however, soon came to realize that this legislation affected much 
more than their time at the doctor’s office. HIPAA displays an 
inherent disdain for informal discovery, a disdain that has led some 
attorneys to complain that HIPAA’s restrictions prevent them from 
adequately serving their clients.2 In particular, the privacy rules 
promulgated by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
(DHHS) under HIPAA directly affect the way in which litigators 
pursue informal discovery, such as ex parte interviews (i.e. interviews 
conducted without notice to the adverse party).3 This Comment 
discusses not only the effects of HIPAA that have already been 
discussed by the courts, but also delves into unresolved questions 
regarding informal discovery. Until questions about the extent of 
HIPAA’s applications are answered, attorneys and investigators will 
continue to be forced onto unsteady ground in their efforts to 
provide their clients with high-quality representation. 
This Comment argues that while the courts have recognized and 
accepted HIPAA’s disdain for informal discovery (particularly in the 
form of ex parte interviews between physicians and attorneys), this 
disdain should not extend to ex parte communications between 
 
 1. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996). 
 2. See Jerry Potter, Can We Talk? The Recent Givens Decision Says No, 38 TENN. B.J. 
15, 20 (2002); Bobby Russ, Can We Talk? The Rest of the Story or Why Defense Attorneys Should 
Not Talk to the Plaintiff’s Doctors, 39 TENN. B.J. 29, 29 (2003). 
 3. See HIPAA Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. § 164 (2006). 
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emergency response personnel and attorneys. In many jurisdictions, 
HIPAA has been interpreted to limit contact with a plaintiff’s 
physician to formal discovery through depositions and 
interrogatories. In some jurisdictions, ex parte interviews are never 
allowed. This stance is understandable considering the premium 
placed on personal health information and the policy considerations 
that support protection of the physician-patient privilege. But the 
rules and definitions of HIPAA have, perhaps unintentionally, 
extended this restriction against ex parte interviews to emergency 
response personnel. In the past, common practice in products 
liability or personal injury litigation has been for the attorney to 
conduct informal interviews with fact witnesses, such as EMTs, in an 
effort to obtain as much information as possible during the early 
stages of litigation. A cautious and perceptive attorney, or an 
attorney threatened with HIPAA sanctions by opposing counsel, 
would note that technically, HIPAA proscribes such interviews with 
EMTs and paramedics. This Comment argues that such a 
proscription is unnecessary, and should be eliminated. 
The application of HIPAA’s regulatory scheme to EMTs and 
paramedics can be problematic for an attorney, especially one who is 
used to conducting ex parte interviews according to common 
practice.4 Nevertheless, should the courts strictly adhere to HIPAA’s 
language, it is both likely and unfortunate that emergency response 
personnel would be subject to the same restrictions as a plaintiff’s 
physician, thus eliminating useful tools for early discovery in 
products liability and personal injury litigation. But strong policy 
reasons support excluding EMTs and paramedics from HIPAA’s 
restrictions. 
 
 4. For indications of the common opinion among attorneys that fact witnesses should 
be personally interviewed as soon as possible, see, e.g., Jacob Williams Law Firm, PLLC, 
Personal Injury, http://jacobwilliamslaw.com/indexpage_7/PracticeArea.shtml (last visited 
Sept. 13, 2006) (“[S]omeone should interview all witnesses and record their comments. Such 
interviews should be completed as soon as possible as witnesses’ memories tend to fade with 
time.”); LawInfo.com, Auto/Truck Accidents Attorneys, http://www.lawinfo.com/index. 
cfm/fuseaction/Client.lawarea/categoryid/1177 (last visited Sept. 13, 2006) (“Interview all 
witnesses and record their comments either at the scene of the accident or as soon as possible 
afterwards. It is important to do these interviews as quickly as possible because witnesses’ 
memories tend to fade with time and the information you get may not be as valuable to you. 
Information gathered immediately or very soon after the accident will be much more accurate 
than any recalled at some later date.”). 
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The physician-patient privilege, which supplies much of the 
incentive for the privacy of personal medical information, does not 
exist in an emergency responder context.5 As a result, the policy 
implications of the physician-patient privilege are weakened in an 
emergency response context. EMTs and paramedics do not usually 
have a continuing relationship with patients, nor are they particularly 
sought out or chosen by patients. And most importantly, there is no 
historical legal basis for applying the physician-patient privilege to 
EMTs or paramedics. 
EMTs and paramedics are also less likely to disclose confidential 
personal information. Generally, the purpose behind informal 
interviews with emergency response personnel early on in litigation is 
to assess the facts behind an incident and to discover the types of 
injuries that may have occurred. The facts surrounding an accident 
do not constitute personal medical information, and the injuries 
incurred during an accident are not protected in litigation because 
they represent a basis for a plaintiff’s claim for relief. 
Finally, emergency response personnel are involved in numerous 
incidents each day, and tend to forget details that a defense attorney 
may find important, especially in the context of deposition testimony 
given months or years after an incident. The motivation for a quick 
informal interview with an emergency responder is to glean essential 
facts that might be forgotten prior to a deposition or that might not 
be considered important enough by the responder to be included in 
the usual reports and paperwork. Such information can be invaluable 
to an attorney. 
This Comment begins with a discussion of informal discovery 
and the HIPAA regulations that affect informal discovery in products 
liability and personal injury cases. Part III then discusses recent cases 
in which the courts, at both the federal and state levels, have 
interpreted HIPAA regulations in relation to discovery issues in civil 
actions, particularly ex parte interviews with a plaintiff’s physician. 
Part IV goes one step beyond these court decisions and discusses 
how HIPAA’s regulations apply not only to physicians but also to 
EMTs and paramedics. Part IV also analyzes the policy issues that 
will inevitably arise when this question comes before the courts. Part 
V offers a brief conclusion. 
 
 5. See 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 349 & n.6 (2006). 
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II. HIPAA 
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
was passed to 
improve portability and continuity of health insurance coverage in 
the group and individual markets, to combat waste, fraud, and 
abuse in health insurance and health care delivery, to promote the 
use of medical savings accounts, to improve access to long-term 
care services and coverage, to simplify the administration of health 
insurance, and for other purposes.6 
When it comes to litigation, however, the parts of the Act that are of 
greatest importance are the privacy rules created to restrict the use 
and disclosure of an individual’s personal health information.7 These 
rules and procedures limit and control the way an attorney (or 
anyone else) can discover the health-related information of another 
individual. Thus, litigators need to be familiar with HIPAA to avoid 
violating its restrictions.8  
A. Authorizations 
HIPAA’s restrictions on the discovery of personal medical 
information are broadly applicable and are manifest to the public 
mainly through the prolific increase in required consent and 
authorization forms at the doctor’s office. To begin, HIPAA states 
that except in a few instances—such as when consent alone is 
sufficient—“a covered entity may not use or disclose protected 
health information without an authorization that is valid under this 
section. When a covered entity obtains or receives a valid 
authorization for its use or disclosure of protected health 
information, such use or disclosure must be consistent with such 
authorization.”9 Essentially, a “covered entity” must not disseminate 
a person’s medical information without the person’s written 
 
 6. HIPAA, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936. 
 7. See Robert B. Miller & Jeff Robertson, HIPAA? Huh?: Discovering Medical Records 
in Oregon After HIPAA, 64 OR. ST. B. BULL. 31, 31 (2004). 
 8. Elizabeth Robinson, HIPAA for Litigators, 8 HAW. B.J. 5, 5 (2004). 
 9. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(1) (2005). HIPAA expressly permits a covered entity to 
disclose health information without an authorization to other covered entities for purposes of 
“treatment, payment, or health care operations.” Id. § 164.506(a). In such instances, the 
health care provider is not required to obtain a full authorization with all of the elements listed 
in § 164.508. It may, however, obtain a simple signed consent form. See id. § 164.506(b)(1). 
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authorization, and the “covered entity” must adhere to the express 
terms of the authorization if any information is indeed disclosed. 
One can easily see the impact of this requirement in the 
proliferation of paperwork that awaits anyone in need of medical 
care. But this authorization rule is not as simple as one might think. 
A number of ambiguities tend to create confusion about this and 
HIPAA’s other requirements.10 One such ambiguity lies in the 
application of the term “covered entity.”11 HIPAA “states that 
‘covered entities’ include health care providers, health plans (which 
include group plans), insurance companies, parts of Medicare, 
Medicaid, long-term care providers, and employee welfare benefit 
plans. The term also includes health care clearinghouses, which 
process health data and provide billing services.”12 As will be 
discussed later, the breadth of the definition of a “covered entity” is 
problematic and should be limited in scope.13 
A second point of confusion is what exactly constitutes a “valid” 
authorization. According to the text of HIPAA, a valid authorization 
must contain specific elements such as a description of the 
information to be used or disclosed, the name of the person 
authorized to make the requested use or disclosure, the name of the 
person to whom the covered entity may make the requested use or 
disclosure, a description of each purpose of the requested use or 
disclosure, an expiration date or event, and a dated signature.14 In 
addition, a valid authorization must place an individual on notice of 
the right to revoke the authorization in writing, of the ability or 
inability of the covered entity to condition treatment upon signature 
of the authorization, and of the fact that information subject to the 
authorization may cease to be protected.15 Finally, an authorization 
must be written in plain language, and if the authorization allows a 
covered entity to disclose protected health information, the 
individual who signed it must receive a copy.16 
 
 10. Laura Parker, Medical-Privacy Law Creates Wide Confusion, USA TODAY, Oct. 17, 
2003, at A1. 
 11. See David R. Morantz, Comment, HIPAA’s Headaches: A Call for a First 
Amendment Exception to the Newly Enacted Health Care Privacy Rules, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 
479, 482 (2005). 
 12. Id. (citations omitted). 
 13. See infra Part IV.A. 
 14. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(1). 
 15. Id. § 164.508(c)(2). 
 16. Id. § 164.508(c)(3)–(4). 
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An authorization can become defective, and therefore null, in 
several ways. An authorization becomes defective if the expiration 
date has passed or the expiration event is known by the covered 
entity to have occurred, the authorization has not been filled out 
completely, the authorization is known by the covered entity to have 
been revoked, the authorization violates prohibitions against 
compound authorizations or conditioning of treatment on 
authorization, or if any material information in the authorization is 
known by the covered entity to be false.17 The myriad requirements 
and possible disqualifiers tend to add confusion as to when an 
authorization is valid, what information is permitted to be disclosed, 
and to whom the information is available. 
B. Exceptions to the Authorization Requirement 
While the authorization requirement is the most pervasive and 
perhaps most significant to the average person, it is not always viable 
for a defense attorney to obtain a plaintiff’s authorization in order to 
receive medical records or other protected health information when 
the records become at issue in a lawsuit. If an attorney wishes to 
conduct an ex parte interview with a plaintiff’s treating physician 
(assuming the law of that jurisdiction permits such an interview), 
HIPAA does nothing to prohibit the plaintiff from simply refusing to 
sign the authorization. In a personal injury or products liability 
lawsuit, the medical treatment and condition of the plaintiff is one of 
the central issues, and thus the plaintiff’s medical information is 
pertinent and necessary for proper defense. For this reason, HIPAA 
includes several exceptions to the authorization requirement that are 
of particular importance in litigation. 
HIPAA provides that an authorization is not required in order 
for a covered entity to disclose protected health information in 
judicial or administrative proceedings and allows disclosure in 
response to an order of a court or administrative tribunal.18 Health 
information can also be disclosed without an authorization  
 
[i]n response to a subpoena, discovery request, or other lawful 
process, that is not accompanied by an order of a court . . . , if: 
 
 17. Id. § 164.508(b)(2). 
 18. Id. § 164.512(e)(1)(i)–(ii). 
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(A) The covered entity receives satisfactory assurance . . . from the 
party seeking the information that reasonable efforts have been 
made by such party to ensure that the individual who is the subject 
of the protected health information that has been requested has 
been given notice of the request; or 
(B) The covered entity receives satisfactory assurance . . . from the 
party seeking the information that reasonable efforts have been 
made by such party to secure a qualified protective order . . . .19 
The simplest way to gain access to a plaintiff’s medical records is 
by obtaining a court order,20 but medical records can also be 
disclosed if the party seeking the information can provide 
“satisfactory assurance” to the covered entity that reasonable efforts 
have been made to inform the subject of the request that the 
information is being sought.21 This can be accomplished by 
providing documentation proving that the party requesting the 
information has made a good-faith effort to provide written notice to 
individuals whose records are being requested.22 As long as the 
notice includes sufficient information about the litigation for which 
the records are sought, and the party whose records are at issue has 
had sufficient time to object to the disclosure, the court can permit 
the records to be disclosed.23 
A third method for obtaining the medical records without an 
authorization is to make a showing of “satisfactory assurance” that 
reasonable efforts have been made to obtain a protective order.24 The 
documentation in that case should show that either (1) the parties to 
the dispute giving rise to the request for information have agreed to 
a qualified protective order and have presented it to the court, or (2) 
the party seeking the protected health information has requested a 
qualified protective order from the court.25 A “qualified protective 
order” is an order of the court or a stipulation by the parties to the 
litigation that both prohibits the parties from using or disclosing the 
protected health information for any purpose other than the 
 
 19. Id. § 164.512(e)(1)(ii). 
 20. See generally id. § 164.512(e)(1)(i).  
 21. Id. § 164.512(e)(1)(iii). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. § 164.512(e)(1)(iv). 
 25. Id. 
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litigation or proceeding for which such information was requested, 
and requires the return or destruction of the protected health 
information (including all copies made) at the end of the litigation or 
proceeding.26 
Finally, HIPAA does not prevent a covered entity from releasing 
protected information pursuant to a subpoena, discovery request, or 
other lawful process, even if the entity does not receive satisfactory 
assurances, as long as the party seeking the information has made 
reasonable efforts to provide satisfactory notice or obtain a qualified 
protective order.27 Although releasing information in these situations 
is allowed, to avoid coming into conflict with HIPAA’s regulatory 
scheme, discovery requests and court orders must be drafted to 
request only the minimum amount of information necessary.28 
C. Ex Parte Interviews 
The specific provisions of HIPAA that govern discovery of 
protected personal health information are lengthy and confusing,29 
but they are by no means comprehensive. One issue not explicitly 
addressed in HIPAA’s text is the legality of defense attorneys’ 
practice of conducting ex parte interviews with plaintiffs’ physicians. 
Despite the effect that HIPAA has had on informal discovery, 
nowhere among HIPAA’s express purposes, or even in HIPAA’s 
legislative history, is any reference made to ex parte interviews.30 
Rather, the impact on informal discovery tactics in litigation has 
come without an expressed Congressional intent to that end.31 Not 
only is there a conspicuous absence of “any reference to or any 
balancing of the competing policy considerations regarding ex parte 
interviews,”32 but the DHHS specifically stated that at least one of its 
HIPAA privacy regulations was “not intended to disrupt current 
practice whereby an individual who is a party to a proceeding and has 
put his or her medical condition at issue will not prevail without 
 
 26. Id. § 164.512(e)(1)(v). 
 27. Id. § 164.512(e)(1)(vi). 
 28. Id. § 164.502(b). 
 29. See Parker, supra note 10, at A1 (pointing out that HIPAA’s privacy regulations 
began as a 337-word guideline before swelling to 101,000 words). 
 30. See Conning the IADC Newsletters, 71 DEF. COUNS. J. 199, 209 (2004). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 211. 
ROCHE.MRO.DOC  10/12/2006 1:12:45 PM 
1075] HIPAA’s Effect on Informal Discovery 
 1083 
consenting to the production of his or her protected information.”33 
It is important to note that this statement says nothing about 
whether such information has to be provided informally or through 
formal judicial proceedings, and thus does nothing to clarify what 
effect HIPAA will have on informal proceedings such as ex parte 
interviews. 
In addition, some of the cases addressing this issue not only 
involve applying HIPAA to ex parte conversations,34 but also raise 
the question of whether ex parte communications are permitted even 
if HIPAA’s basic requirements for discovery are met. The next Part 
will discuss these cases and how some courts have ruled on the 
legality of ex parte interviews. 
III. EX PARTE INTERVIEWS OF PHYSICIANS UNDER HIPAA 
Prior to HIPAA, many states had already prohibited defense 
attorneys from conducting ex parte interviews with a plaintiff’s 
treating physician.35 In fact, practitioners disagreed about the 
appropriateness of permitting an opposing attorney to privately 
interview a client’s treating physician and argued both sides of the 
issue in law reviews and journal articles.36 In an article published in 
1999, one author listed nineteen states that prohibited ex parte 
interviews with physicians and nineteen states plus the District of 
Columbia where such interviews were permitted.37 By the time full 
compliance with HIPAA was required on April 14, 2003,38 one tally 
 
 33. 65 Fed. Reg. 82,530 (Dec. 28, 2000) (discussing 45 C.F.R. § 164.512). 
 34. HIPAA explicitly includes both oral and recorded information in its definition of 
“health information.” See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d(4) (2005). 
 35. See Christopher Smith, Comment, Recognizing the Split: The Jurisdictional 
Treatment of Defense Counsel’s Ex Parte Contact with Plaintiff’s Treating Physician, 23 J. 
LEGAL PROF. 247, 252–53 (1999). 
 36. See, e.g., Barbara Podlucky Berens, Note, Defendants’ Right To Conduct Ex Parte 
Interviews with Treating Physicians in Drug or Medical Device Cases, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1451 
(1989); Smith, supra note 35. 
 37. The states prohibiting ex parte interviews included Alabama, Arizona, Florida, 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New 
York, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and 
Wyoming. See Smith, supra note 35, at 252–55. 
  The jurisdictions that permitted ex parte interviews included Alaska, Arkansas, 
California, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. See id. 
 38. Crenshaw v. Mony Life Ins. Co., 318 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1027–28 (S.D. Cal. 2004). 
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found that fifteen states and the District of Columbia expressly 
permitted conducting ex parte interviews with a plaintiff’s health care 
provider while twenty-four states expressly prohibited the same 
practice.39 Considering this disparity, it is not surprising that the 
issue of ex parte interviews under HIPAA came before the courts in 
only a matter of months. As noted above, HIPAA did not directly 
address the propriety of conducting ex parte interviews. 
Consequently, subsequent court decisions applying HIPAA were 
largely decided on state laws and on conflicting policy 
considerations. In the end, these decisions did little to unify the 
disparate treatment of ex parte communications with physicians.  
A. Court Determinations of HIPAA’s Impact on Informal Discovery 
While the bulk of the following cases were decided in the federal 
courts, the first case of note was decided in a New Jersey state court 
in September 2003.40 In Smith v. American Home Products Corp., 
plaintiffs alleged personal injuries as the result of the use of 
phenylpropanolamine (PPA).41 The defendant drug manufacturers 
filed a motion to compel ex parte interviews with the plaintiffs’ 
physicians.42 This was a case of first impression as to whether HIPAA 
preempted New Jersey case law that expressly permitted ex parte 
interviews with a plaintiff’s health care provider.43 
The key regulation in this case was 45 C.F.R. § 160.203, which 
provides that HIPAA preempts any contrary provisions of state law 
unless “[t]he provision of State law relates to the privacy of 
individually identifiable health information and is more stringent 
than a standard, requirement, or implementation specification 
adopted under [HIPAA].”44 Accordingly, the New Jersey Superior 
Court analyzed New Jersey’s state law and determined that HIPAA 
 
 39. Connie A. Mateo & David C. Uitti, HIPAA and State Discovery Practices, 3 
PHARMACEUTICAL & MED. DEVICE L. BULL., Sept. 16, 2003, at 1. 
 40. Smith v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 855 A.2d 608 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2003). 
 41. Id. at 610. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id.; see Stempler v. Speidell, 495 A.2d 857 (N.J. 1985) (creating informal discovery 
procedures for the state of New Jersey which include provisions allowing for the ex parte 
interview of a plaintiff’s physician). 
 44. 45 C.F.R. § 160.203(b) (2005); see also Law v. Zuckerman, 307 F. Supp. 2d 705, 
709–10 (D. Md. 2004). 
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does not preempt New Jersey’s informal discovery techniques.45 The 
court stated that a determination of whether a state law was more 
stringent and thus avoided preemption should be based on a 
determination of whether the state law 
1) prohibits or restricts a use or disclosure more so than the Privacy 
Rule; 2) permits greater rights of access to or amendment of 
information; 3) provides the individual with a greater amount of 
information; 4) narrows the scope or duration of an authorization 
or consent, expands the criteria necessary for an authorization or 
consent, or reduces the coercive effect of the circumstances 
surrounding an authorization or consent; or 5) requires longer or 
more detailed retention or reporting of disclosures.46 
 The court relied on the fact that none of HIPAA’s regulations 
explicitly address the issue of ex parte interviews with treating 
physicians47 and made the determination that informal discovery in 
New Jersey would be governed by state law. In the court’s words, 
“[n]owhere in HIPAA does the issue of ex parte [sic] interviews with 
treating physicians come into view; therefore, this court finds no 
express preemption regarding such interviews, leaving [them] a 
viable tool for defense counsel.”48 While those practicing law in New 
Jersey could thereafter feel comfortable adhering to state law and 
conducting ex parte interviews, the Smith decision left little guidance 
for those in other jurisdictions. 
Unlike the New Jersey court in Smith, the Federal District Court 
for the District of Maryland concluded that HIPAA was more 
stringent than the relevant state law.49 In one of the earliest federal 
cases on the subject, Law v. Zuckerman, the plaintiff, Rosalyn Law, 
sued physician David Zuckerman for medical malpractice.50 During 
pre-trial discovery, the defendant’s counsel conducted ex parte 
interviews with the plaintiff’s current physician, Thomas Pinckert.51 
As a result of those interviews, the plaintiff filed a motion that raised 
two questions of first impression in the Fourth Circuit: (1) did 
 
 45. Smith, 855 A.2d at 621. 
 46. Id. at 622. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 626. 
 49. Zuckerman, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 711. 
 50. Id. at 707. 
 51. Id. 
ROCHE.MRO.DOC 10/12/2006 1:12:45 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2006 
1086 
defense counsel’s ex parte communications with the plaintiff’s 
physician violate HIPAA, and (2) if so, was preventing defense 
counsel from having any further contacts with Dr. Pinckert a proper 
remedy?52 
The court first found that HIPAA was more stringent than the 
applicable Maryland law, and held that all ex parte communications 
must be “conducted in accordance with the procedures set forth in 
HIPAA.”53 The court ruled that while defense counsel’s contact with 
the plaintiff’s physician was technically a violation of HIPAA, 
defendant’s attorneys had acted in good faith and the remedy 
requested by the plaintiff—preventing defense counsel from any 
further contact with Dr. Pinckert—was inappropriate.54 Most 
importantly, however, the court determined that ex parte interviews 
with a plaintiff’s physician are legitimate as long as defense counsel 
adheres to the procedures set forth by HIPAA.55 Unlike Smith, 
where the decision to permit the ex parte interview had been based 
on state law, the court here found that HIPAA itself permitted ex 
parte interviews, as long as those interviews were conducted pursuant 
to HIPAA’s restrictions. 
Other courts disagreed. In the spring of 2004, the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of California decided whether 
defense counsel should be disqualified for improper ex parte 
communications with one of the plaintiff’s treating physicians.56 In 
the unusual circumstances of Crenshaw v. Mony Life Insurance Co., 
the defense hired an expert witness, Dr. Harris, who had on one 
occasion treated the plaintiff.57 If the plaintiff’s one meeting with Dr. 
Harris was sufficient to make Dr. Harris a treating physician, HIPAA 
required that defense counsel give notice to the plaintiff before 
meeting with him.58 
The court determined, based on both federal and state law, that 
Dr. Harris was not the plaintiff’s treating physician, and therefore 
defense counsel had not committed any ethical violations.59 The 
 
 52. Id. at 706–07. 
 53. Id. at 711. 
 54. Id. at 712–13. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Crenshaw v. Mony Life Ins. Co., 318 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1020–21 (S.D. Cal. 2004). 
 57. Id. at 1018. 
 58. Id. at 1027. 
 59. Id. at 1023–24. 
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court found, however, that even though the informal discovery 
techniques employed by defense counsel were not prohibited by 
California law, “HIPAA does not authorize ex parte contacts with 
healthcare providers.”60 The court’s opinion was that “[o]nly formal 
discovery requests appear to satisfy the requirements of [HIPAA].”61 
While Zuckerman required that limited ex parte interviews be 
conducted in compliance with HIPAA, Crenshaw went further, 
finding that informal discovery was in direct violation of HIPAA’s 
regulatory scheme. 
Another federal court restricted the use of ex parte 
communications when the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) alleged that the Boston Market Corporation 
had engaged in disability discrimination.62 During discovery, the 
defendant filed a motion seeking an order allowing ex parte 
communication with two psychologists who had evaluated one of 
the complaining witnesses.63 The witness admitted that the 
defendant was authorized to obtain all of her medical records and to 
depose her doctors, but contended that HIPAA precluded ex parte 
discussions between the defendants and her doctors or 
psychologists.64 
The court pointed out, as had the other federal courts before it, 
that HIPAA “does not expressly prohibit ex parte communications 
with health providers for an adverse party, but neither does it 
authorize such communications.”65 The court then discussed both 
the Crenshaw66 and Zuckerman67 decisions before concluding that 
“ex parte communications regarding the disclosure of health 
information, while not expressly prohibited by HIPAA, create, as the 
court in [Zuckerman] warned, too great a risk of running afoul of 
that statute’s strong federal policy in favor of protecting the privacy 
of patient medical records.”68 The court advised that while “non-
 
 60. Id. at 1029. 
 61. Id. 
 62. EEOC v. Boston Mkt. Corp., No. CV 03-4227(LDW) (WDW), 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 27338 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2004). 
 63. Id. at *1. 
 64. Id. at *1–2. 
 65. Id. at *16. 
 66. Crenshaw, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 1020. 
 67. Law v. Zuckerman, 307 F. Supp. 2d 705, 711 (D. Md. 2004). 
 68. Boston Mkt., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27338, at *18. 
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health related information such as the time or place of depositions” 
can be discussed through ex parte communications, the “release of 
health information is to be made only through the use of methods 
listed in HIPAA.”69 As a result of this determination, the court 
declined to permit ex parte release of the plaintiff’s personal health 
information, even with a protective order that would meet HIPAA’s 
requirements.70 This decision was a confirmation of the California 
District Court’s decision that ex parte communications between 
defense counsel and plaintiff’s health providers are not permissible. 
In the past year and a half, the federal courts have decided at 
least three more cases in which ex parte interviews with a plaintiff’s 
physician were at issue. In the first case, the court decided that ex 
parte interviews would be permitted if a qualified protective order 
was in place, but the two most recent decisions tended to follow the 
analysis of EEOC and have severely limited or completely done away 
with this form of informal discovery. 
The first of these decisions was Bayne v. Provost, which was 
decided in January 2005 in the Northern District of New York.71 
The defendants had presented the plaintiff with a HIPAA 
authorization form in order to gain access to the defendant’s medical 
records.72 Rather than signing the authorization provided by the 
defendants, however, the plaintiff provided a limited medical release 
that included the following statements: “This authorization is for 
written records ONLY. You are NOT authorized to discuss any 
matters relating to my medical condition, course of treatment or 
prognosis.”73 The defendants objected to this limitation and asked 
the court to decide if the plaintiff had the right to refuse defendants’ 
request for an ex parte interview with plaintiff’s medical providers.74 
In making its determination, the court had little to rely on, but 
took into account Zuckerman and Crenshaw.75 The court concluded 
that an ex parte interview would be appropriate if a qualified 
protective order (one consistent with HIPAA) was in place.76 While 
 
 69. Id. at *18–19. 
 70. Id. at *20. 
 71. Bayne v. Provost, 359 F. Supp. 2d 234 (N.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 72. Id. at 235–36. 
 73. Id. at 236. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 240. 
 76. Id. at 241. 
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the court stated that it was “not quite prepared to say that there are 
no built-in protections . . . which the Plaintiff, himself, can invoke to 
limit his medical records and minimize the exposure of ex parte [sic] 
interviews,”77 the court, nevertheless, granted the defendants a 
qualified protective order and authorization to conduct an ex parte 
interview with one of the plaintiff’s medical providers.78 
Shortly after the Bayne decision, the District Court for the 
Eastern District of Michigan interpreted HIPAA more strictly.79 
Croskey v. BMW of North America, Inc. involved the alleged 
explosion of a radiator in a 1992 BMW 325.80 Plaintiff brought a 
products liability action against the car manufacturer, and the 
defendant filed a motion seeking the opportunity “to meet ex parte 
with all of plaintiff’s treating physicians and health care providers.”81 
The court first made the determination that HIPAA preempted 
Michigan law.82 Then, following a review of existent case law on the 
subject, the court concluded that 
HIPAA does not permit informal discovery. With regard to 
HIPAA, at least one court has stated that “informal discovery of 
protected health information is now prohibited unless the patient 
consents.” Another court has stated that “HIPAA does not 
authorize ex parte contacts with healthcare providers.” . . . I find 
these cases persuasive for the theory that ex parte meetings with 
defense counsel are not permitted by HIPAA.83 
 Relying on its determination of “HIPAA’s distaste for informal 
discovery,”84 the court ruled that ex parte interviews of plaintiff’s 
physicians are available only when (1) the defendant has a HIPAA 
valid authorization, (2) plaintiff’s counsel has been notified of the 
desire to conduct the interview, and (3) the physician has been 
notified that such an interview is not required.85 If both the plaintiff 
 
 77. Id. at 241–42. 
 78. Id. at 243. 
 79. See Croskey v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., No. 02-CV-73747-DT, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 3673 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 14, 2005). 
 80. Id. at *2. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at *20. 
 83. Id. at *15–16 (citing Law v. Zuckerman, 307 F. Supp. 2d 705, 711 (D. Md. 2004); 
Crenshaw v. Mony Life Ins. Co., 318 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1029 (S.D. Cal. 2004)). 
 84. Id. at *29. 
 85. Id. 
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and the physician approve, the ex parte meeting can be conducted.86 
Essentially, the Croskey court placed complete control over the 
possibility of an ex parte interview in the hands of the plaintiff. The 
court stated that no matter which of HIPAA’s provisions are used to 
obtain an interview (such as obtaining a court order or issuing a 
subpoena), the notice requirements must be fulfilled,87 once again 
reiterating “HIPAA’s distaste for informal discovery.”88 
The Croskey decision illustrates that the use of ex parte interviews 
during discovery continues to be limited. While the majority of the 
courts have determined that the informal and unauthorized use of 
such meetings was eliminated by HIPAA, some cases have gone so 
far as to prohibit, or severely limit, the arrangement of ex parte 
interviews pursuant to HIPAA’s formal procedures. The Croskey 
court felt that HIPAA was so strongly against informal discovery that 
an ex parte interview could only be conducted with the permission of 
the court, the plaintiff, and the physician himself.89 In light of these 
requirements, a formal deposition would appear to be the simplest 
method of discovery, and only in unusual circumstances would a 
defense attorney find it useful to pursue the possibility of an ex parte 
conversation with the plaintiff’s physician. 
In July 2005, another federal district court considered the 
legality of ex parte interviews.90 In that case, a class action suit 
against the manufacturers of the drug Vioxx, the court had originally 
ordered that any party wishing to interview a plaintiff’s physician had 
to serve opposing counsel with a notice of their intent to do so.91 
According to the court’s order, “opposing counsel would then be 
permitted to attend and participate in the noticed interview, but if 
opposing counsel decided not to participate in the interview, the 
noticing party could conduct said interview without opposing 
counsel’s presence.”92 
The plaintiffs challenged the order, arguing that its application 
should be limited to those physicians who had been named as 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at *33–34. 
 88. Id. at *34. 
 89. Id. 
 90. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 230 F.R.D. 473 (E.D. La. 2005). 
 91. Id. at 474. 
 92. Id. 
ROCHE.MRO.DOC  10/12/2006 1:12:45 PM 
1075] HIPAA’s Effect on Informal Discovery 
 1091 
defendants.93 In the end, the court decided that the patient-physician 
relationship would best be protected by restricting the defendants 
from conducting ex parte interviews of the plaintiff’s treating 
physicians, but allowing plaintiff’s counsel to engage in ex parte 
interviews with any doctors that had not been named defendants.94 
The court reasoned that 
[t]he Defendants still are entitled to all of the medical records of 
the Plaintiffs as well as the Plaintiff Profile Forms setting forth each 
Plaintiff’s detailed medical history. The Defendants can also 
continue to exercise their right to depose the Plaintiffs’ treating 
physicians or confer with them in the presence of Plaintiffs’ 
counsel. Furthermore, as a practical matter, the Defendants already 
have information, including documentation, regarding what its 
representatives told the treating physicians about Vioxx. Therefore, 
the Defendants do not need the doctors to tell them in ex parte 
conferences what they already know.95 
This argument provides support for the elimination of informal 
discovery of personally identifiable health information. But some 
argue that decisions such as this ignore the special considerations 
that make ex parte interviews so valuable to defense counsel.96 While 
both sides of the debate have offered reasons for their positions, 
stronger reasoning supports the usefulness and value of such 
interviews. 
B. Policy Reasons Proffered for the Elimination of Informal Discovery 
The preceding decisions are not in complete agreement on all 
issues. Some of the courts permitted ex parte interviews only 
according to the terms of HIPAA.97 One unreported opinion added 
additional requirements to HIPAA’s express rules in order to protect 
a plaintiff’s privacy rights.98 Others prohibited ex parte interviews 
with a plaintiff’s treating physician altogether.99 But even the New 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 477. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See Berens, supra note 36. 
 97. See, e.g., Bayne v. Provost, 359 F. Supp. 2d 234, 241 (N.D.N.Y. 2005); Law v. 
Zuckerman, 307 F. Supp. 2d 705, 711 (D. Md. 2004). 
 98. Croskey v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., No. 02-CV-73747-DT, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
3673, at *34 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 14, 2005). 
 99. See Crenshaw v. Mony Life Ins. Co., 318 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1029 (S.D. Cal. 2004); 
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Jersey state court holding HIPAA inapplicable did not freely permit 
ex parte interviews; rather, interviews in that court’s jurisdiction are 
still subject to the restrictions imposed by the Stempler decision.100 
Thus, in the time following HIPAA’s passage, no court in the 
United States has held that ex parte interviews with a plaintiff’s 
treating physician are permitted absent some sort of formal 
restrictions. A defense attorney wishing to conduct an ex parte 
interview with a plaintiff’s health provider must generally adhere to 
strict and complicated formal procedures, and in some situations the 
interview is either completely dependent on the plaintiff’s willingness 
to allow it or prohibited altogether. 
The debate regarding the extent to which informal discovery 
should be permitted continues in spite of the seeming consensus that 
informal discovery such as ex parte interviews are to be disfavored 
when it comes to physicians. “The simple fact that Congress and the 
DHHS did not address ex parte interviews in HIPAA and the 
regulations is compelling evidence that courts retain the discretion to 
permit these informal discovery devices on a jurisdiction-by-
jurisdiction basis.”101 No set standard is in place to govern the 
availability of an ex parte interview, and the extent to which ex parte 
interviews are permitted in any particular instance will depend in 
large part on the jurisdiction’s judicial analysis of HIPAA’s interplay 
with state law. There is still a split among states as to whether ex 
parte communications with a plaintiff’s treating physician should be 
permitted at all. What follows is a discussion of the policy 
considerations that are at the heart of the disagreement. 
1. The physician-patient privilege 
Much of the support for HIPAA’s protections, and for general 
privacy considerations in any medical context, is based on 
recognition of the confidential relationship between doctor and 
patient. While the physician-patient privilege did not exist under the 
common law, most states recognize it by statute.102 The privilege 
 
EEOC v. Boston Mkt. Corp., No. CV 03-4227(LDW) (WDW), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
27338, at *20–21 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2004). 
 100. Stempler v. Speidell, 495 A.2d 857 (N.J. 1985); Smith v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 
855 A.2d 608, 624 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2003). 
 101. Conning the IADC Newsletters, supra note 30, at 214. 
 102. See Smith, supra note 35, at 247–48 (citing David L. Woodard, Note, Shielding the 
Plaintiff and Physician: The Prohibition of Ex Parte Contacts with a Plaintiff’s Treating 
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provides support for the limitation or elimination of ex parte 
interviews and encompasses a number of policy justifications, such as 
encouraging patients to freely and candidly discuss medical concerns 
with their doctors, fulfilling the public’s expectation that such 
communications will be held privately, and protecting physicians that 
lack legal training from inadvertent disclosures.103 Thus, it is not 
surprising that prior to HIPAA’s passage, almost half of the states 
already prohibited ex parte interviews of a plaintiff’s treating 
physician.104 One federal court, in defending its decision to disallow 
defense counsel’s ex parte contacts with plaintiffs’ physicians, went so 
far as to quote the classical version of the Hippocratic Oath: “‘What 
I may see or hear in the course of the treatment or even outside of 
the treatment in regard to the life of men, which on no account one 
must spread abroad, I will keep to myself, holding such things 
shameful to be spoken about.’”105 The court explained that 
[t]he ethical rules and attendant laws regarding the relationship 
between a physician and a patient serve both utilitarian and fairness 
purposes. Confidentiality reduces the stigma attached to seeking 
treatment for some infectious diseases and invites patients to 
provide information about previous ailments with greater candor. 
This effect allows physicians to provide more thorough preventative 
care. Moreover, because “almost every member of the public is 
aware of the promise of discretion contained in the Hippocratic 
Oath, [] every patient has a right to rely upon this warranty of 
silence.” Impairing the relationship between a physician and a 
patient would therefore not only be unfair to patients that have 
provided information to their physicians in confidence, but could 
reduce the quality of medical care provided.106 
While the opposition to informal discovery techniques involving 
health care providers is supported by these considerations, neither 
HIPAA’s text nor its legislative history contains a justification or 
explanation of its intentions with regard to ex parte interviews,107 and 
 
Physician, 13 CAMPBELL L. REV. 233, 236 (1991)). 
 103. Id. at 251. 
 104. See Mateo & Uitti, supra note 39, at 1. 
 105. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 230 F.R.D. 473, 476 (E.D. La. 2005) (quoting 
LUDWIG EDELSTEIN, THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH: TEXT, TRANSLATION, AND INTERPRETATION 
(1943)). 
 106. Id. at 477 (internal citations omitted). 
 107. See Conning the IADC Newsletters, supra note 30, at 211. 
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we are left only to assume that basic medical privacy concerns were at 
the heart of the privacy rules promulgated by the DHHS. One 
problem with relying on the physician-patient privilege to support 
the prohibition of ex parte interviews is that in the context of 
products liability or personal injury litigation, the concerns that 
support the privilege are weakened or eliminated when a plaintiff files 
a lawsuit,108 mainly because in so doing, a plaintiff has placed 
previously protected health information at issue, thereby subjecting 
the information to discovery. Nevertheless, the physician-patient 
privilege has proven to be enough of a consideration to warrant 
widespread restrictions on ex parte interviews with physicians. 
2. Arguments that informal discovery can harm physicians 
Another reason put forth for the elimination of informal 
discovery is the burden it places on physicians.109 First, “[p]hysicians 
are placed in unenviable positions when defense attorneys engage 
them in ex parte [sic] communications, because they are confronted 
with numerous competing ethical, legal, and professional pressures in 
deciding whether and how to respond to such requests.”110 
Essentially, when a physician engages in an ex parte interview, the 
danger arises that the physician will reveal confidential information 
unrelated to the subject of the litigation and become liable for the 
disclosure.111 Physicians are usually untrained in the law, and 
allowing a physician to shoulder the burden of possible wrongful 
disclosure is a gamble and is unfair to the doctor.112 One author has 
suggested that if physicians were aware of the possible criminal, civil, 
and administrative penalties that could result from an improper 
physician disclosure, physicians “might object just as loudly as their 
patients to any attempts to engage them in ex parte [sic] 
communications.”113 
 
 108. See Berens, supra note 36, at 1481. 
 109. See David G. Wirtes, Jr., R. Edwin Lamberth & Joanna Gomez, An Important 
Consequence of HIPAA: No More Ex Parte Communications Between Defense Attorneys and 
Plaintiff’s Treating Physicians, 27 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 1, 10 (2003). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Russ, supra note 2, at 29. 
 112. Id. at 29–30 (quoting Roosevelt Hotel Ltd. P’ship v. Sweeney, 394 N.W.2d 353, 
357 (Iowa 1986)). 
 113. Wirtes et al., supra note 109, at 14. 
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Some counter that such arguments fail to take into consideration 
that ex parte conversations with defense attorneys are not mandatory 
for the physician, who always has the opportunity for his own 
attorney to be present if he desires. “[A]llowing ex parte 
communications does not mandate that physicians must talk to 
defense counsel. The treating physician would still be able to decide 
what he or she wants to discuss.”114 Educating doctors on the 
possible legal ramifications of an ex parte interview, and then 
allowing the doctor to decide whether or not to provide the 
interview, would seem to serve the same purpose as prohibiting the 
interview altogether. Having the doctor’s own attorney present 
would also provide the physician with the necessary legal protection. 
It seems that many legislatures, however, have found it easier to 
simply prohibit or restrict ex parte interviews, rather than hope that 
individual doctors know enough to protect themselves from liability 
stemming from an inadvertent disclosure of a patient’s private health 
information. 
Concerns also arise over possible ethical misconduct when an 
attorney representing a medical malpractice insurer is allowed to 
conduct an interview of a plaintiff’s physician insured by that same 
company.115 One state’s Board of Medical Examiners takes the 
position that “it is unethical and unprofessional for a physician to 
allow financial incentives or contractual ties of any kind to adversely 
affect his or her medical judgment of practice care.”116 When 
physicians are placed in these situations, ethical questions are almost 
certain to arise. 
3. The argument that informal discovery harms the civil justice system 
In modern times the rules of discovery and civil procedure are 
intended in large part to prevent “Perry Mason” moments of surprise 
and “trial by ambush.”117 Formal discovery methods such as 
depositions, interrogatories, and ex parte interviews conducted 
 
 114. Smith, supra note 35, at 252 (citing John Jennings, The Physician-Patient 
Relationship: The Permissibility of Ex Parte Communications Between Plaintiff’s Treating 
Physicians and Defense Counsel, 59 MO. L. REV. 441, 459 (1994)). 
 115. Russ, supra note 2, at 30–31 (citing Manion v. N.P.W. Med. Ctr., 676 F. Supp. 
585, 594–95 (M.D. Pa. 1987)). 
 116. Wirtes et al., supra note 109, at 13 (quoting ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 540-X-9-.07 
(2005)). 
 117. Id. at 14. 
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pursuant to regulations allow all parties to an action to keep abreast 
of the relevant issues.118 In addition, following formal discovery 
channels allows the court to keep an eye on (and, when necessary, 
assert control over) the discovery proceedings.119 
Others counter that when a defense attorney meets privately with 
a plaintiff’s physician, the interview is intended to provide the 
defense with information to which the plaintiff’s attorney has already 
had complete access. 
Arguably, plaintiffs’ attorneys who have filed lawsuits placing 
clients’ medical conditions in issue have greater access to medical 
information than defense attorneys because plaintiffs’ counsel can 
easily obtain medical authorizations from their clients. Further, a 
plaintiff’s attorney may communicate freely with her client 
regarding the plaintiff’s medical care and treatment and may even 
contact the plaintiff’s treating physician to discuss care before filing 
the lawsuit.120 
Ex parte interviews would not revive “Perry Mason moments,” but 
rather would place defense and plaintiff’s counsel on the same 
footing. In essence, 
a rule disallowing ex parte communications with a plaintiff’s 
treating physicians attempts to ensure the confidentiality of the 
physician-patient relationship at the expense of the defendant. 
Allowing a plaintiff to have free access to potentially important facts 
and/or expert witnesses while requiring the defendant to use more 
expensive, inconvenient, and burdensome formal discovery 
methods tilts the litigation playing field in favor of the plaintiff.121 
The argument is that rather than creating any kind of disparity, 
permitting ex parte interviews with a plaintiff’s treating physician 
allows equal access to relevant medical information. 
4. Claimed benefits of informal discovery 
Still others assert that, in spite of these arguments, the value of 
the ex parte interviews outweighs any concerns.122 Some defense 
 
 118. See id. 
 119. Id. at 15. 
 120. Melissa A. Couch, Litigating Medical Malpractice Cases in Oklahoma: The 
Aftermath of HIPAA, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 827, 827–28 (2004). 
 121. Jennings, supra note 114, at 475. 
 122. Berens, supra note 36, at 1481. 
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attorneys complain that the elimination of informal discovery 
prevents them from “doing their jobs”123 and contend that informal 
discovery methods are essential to their work.124 In support of this 
claim they argue both (1) that informal discovery is more cost 
effective, and (2) that there is no substitute for the information 
obtained through an ex parte interview.125 One court echoed those 
sentiments, stating that 
 
there are entirely respectable reasons for conducting discovery by 
interview vice deposition: it is less costly and less likely to entail 
logistical or scheduling problems; it is conducive to spontaneity and 
candor in a way depositions can never be; and it is a cost-efficient 
means of eliminating non-essential witnesses.126 
 
Other courts have been critical of these arguments. Regarding 
cost effectiveness, the Supreme Court of Missouri stated, 
It is not clear that ex parte [sic] discussion ultimately results in the 
conservation of resources. The defendant must expend time and 
effort to prepare the authorization and move for the court order 
compelling execution. The defendant will spend further time and 
effort to secure and review the plaintiff’s medical records so that 
the defendant has an intelligent basis upon which to have an ex 
parte [sic] discussion with the physician.127 
In response to the informational argument, one Illinois court stated 
simply that “it is undisputed that ex parte [sic] conferences yield no 
greater evidence, nor do they provide any additional information, 
than that which is already obtainable through the regular methods of 
discovery.”128 The information available through informal means is 
still available to the defense attorney; HIPAA just requires that 
defense attorneys follow formal procedures in order to obtain it. But 
even if the information available turns out to be the same, the 
defense attorney would likely prefer informal discovery since the 
information could be obtained earlier and more easily. 
 
 123. See Russ, supra note 2, at 29. 
 124. See id. 
 125. See id. at 31. 
 126. Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126, 128 (D.D.C. 1983). 
 127. State ex rel. Woytus v. Ryan, 776 S.W.2d 389, 394 (Mo. 1989). 
 128. Petrillo v. Syntex Labs., Inc., 499 N.E.2d 952, 956 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986). 
ROCHE.MRO.DOC 10/12/2006 1:12:45 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2006 
1098 
The idea that the policy reasons for protecting the physician-
patient privilege outweigh any advantages that arise from the use of 
informal discovery methods has not been conclusively accepted, but 
the court decisions reviewed earlier all seem to support formal 
restrictions or elimination of the ex parte interviews of health care 
providers.129 As a result, any defense attorney desiring the 
opportunity to conduct an ex parte interview with a plaintiff’s 
physician must be prepared to satisfy the strict requirements of 
HIPAA’s regulatory scheme, and should be prepared for a denial by 
either the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s physician. “The breadth of 
HIPAA and the substantial repercussions for HIPAA violations 
undoubtedly will cause healthcare providers to think twice before 
agreeing to ex parte interviews,” even if defense counsel has a strong 
argument that HIPAA should not apply.130 
IV. APPLYING HIPAA TO EMERGENCY RESPONDERS 
Recent decisions have clarified the requirements for interviewing 
a plaintiff’s treating physician, at least in a few jurisdictions. At the 
very least, HIPAA’s requirements should be met prior to any ex 
parte communication with the plaintiff’s treating physician. There are 
questions regarding HIPAA’s application, however, which have yet 
to be addressed in any degree by the courts. One of these questions 
is whether the procedural requirements for conducting an ex parte 
interview of a physician are applicable to emergency response 
personnel such as firefighters, EMTs, and paramedics. Often, in 
certain types of litigation such as personal injury or products liability 
cases, there is an incident or accident that serves as the trigger and 
basis for the plaintiff’s claim. In many such cases, a first responder is 
called to the scene and gains personal knowledge of the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the incident. Some firms specializing in 
these areas of defense employ investigators to conduct informal 
interviews with first responders in order to learn the facts at the early 
stages of litigation. However, with HIPAA now in place, and with 
the continued use of HIPAA as a bullying tool to chill contact 
between defense attorneys and plaintiffs’ physicians,131 the question 
 
 129. See infra Part III.A. 
 130. Conning the IADC Newsletters, supra note 30, at 214. 
 131. Id. at 215. 
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has arisen as to whether these informal interviews are also subject to 
HIPAA’s restrictions. 
A. Applying HIPAA to Emergency Response Personnel 
While the courts have not yet had the opportunity to decide 
whether to apply HIPAA’s restrictions to EMTs and paramedics, the 
issue would likely turn in large part on the statutory definitions 
found in HIPAA’s text. In examining HIPAA’s definitions of 
“covered entities,” emergency response personnel are unlikely to be 
considered “covered entities” in any context except that of a “health 
care provider.”132 HIPAA defines a health care provider as a provider 
of services under 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(u), a provider of medical or 
health services under 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(s), and any other person or 
organization who furnishes, bills, or is paid for health care in the 
normal course of business.133 Among the health services listed under 
§ 1395x(s) are ambulance services, “where the use of other methods 
of transportation is contraindicated by the individual’s condition.”134 
This undoubtedly includes emergency situations in which paramedics 
or EMTs accompany patients to the hospital in an ambulance. 
In addition, 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 defines health care as “care, 
services, or supplies related to the health of an individual.”135 The 
statute continues: “Health care includes, but is not limited to, the 
following: Preventive, diagnostic, therapeutic, rehabilitative, 
maintenance, or palliative care, and counseling, service, assessment, 
or procedure with respect to the physical or mental condition, or 
functional status, of an individual or that affects the structure or 
function of the body . . . .”136 Since emergency response personnel 
perform procedures with respect to the physical, mental, or 
functional status of the body, along with diagnosis and assessment, 
they could be technically termed “health care provider[s]” by the 
terms of the statute. Were the issue to be brought before the courts, 
a literal interpretation of HIPAA’s provisions would subject 
 
 132. Under HIPAA’s definitions, emergency response personnel are not a “health plan” 
or a “health care clearinghouse.” 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2005). 
 133. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d(4) (2005). 
 134. Id. § 1395x(s)(7). 
 135. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. 
 136. Id. 
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emergency response personnel to the same discovery limitations that 
apply to physicians.  
Many states have considered whether emergency medical 
personnel are health care providers for the purposes of various state 
statutes. In almost all such cases, EMTs and paramedics have been 
included as health care providers.137 At least one state, however, 
excludes paramedics and EMTs from the category of “health care 
practitioner.” In Watson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,138 the plaintiff 
prevailed at trial, but after the verdict was entered, the parties 
bickered over the amount of attorneys fees.139 One of the plaintiff’s 
contentions was that the defense had violated a Florida statute 
prohibiting the disclosure of information given by a patient to a 
“health care practitioner” unless other requirements were previously 
met, such as the issuance of a subpoena.140 The plaintiff contended 
that defense counsel had violated Florida law by conferring ex parte 
with the paramedic who had responded to the emergency call when 
the plaintiff fell.141 Under section 456.001(6) of the Florida Statutes, 
a “health care practitioner” is a person licensed under certain 
chapters of the Florida Statutes.142 The chapter under which 
paramedics were licensed was absent from the list. On this basis, the 
Federal District Court for the Northern District of Florida noted in 
an unpublished opinion that “[i]t thus was not unlawful, and it also 
was not unreasonable, for defendant’s attorneys to interview the 
paramedic, a witness to events at issue.”143 
 
 137. See, e.g., Bodelson v. City of Littleton, 36 P.3d 214, 215 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001) 
(concluding that paramedics are “health care providers” under Colorado statutes); Mooney v. 
Sneed, No. 02A01-9709-CV-00210, 1999 WL 174133, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 
1999), aff’d, 30 S.W.3d 304 (Tenn. 2000) (holding that EMTs are “health care practitioners” 
under Tennessee statute); Gross v. Innes, 930 S.W.2d 237, 239 (Tex. App. 1996) (holding 
that paramedics are “medical personnel” for purposes of governmental immunity statute); 
Carter v. Milford Valley Mem’l Hosp., 996 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (holding 
that paramedics are “health care providers” under Utah’s Malpractice Act); Marthaller v. King 
County Hosp., 973 P.2d 1098, 1102 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (“[A] paramedic is a health care 
practitioner . . . .”); Linville v. City of Janesville, 497 N.W.2d 465, 472 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993), 
aff’d, 516 N.W.2d 427 (Wis. 1994) (holding that paramedics are medical personnel for 
purposes of Wisconsin’s governmental immunity statute). 
 138. No. 4:03CV402RH/WCS, 2005 WL 1266686 (N.D. Fla. May 25, 2005). 
 139. Id. at *1. 
 140. Id. at *2; see FLA. STAT. § 456.057(6) (2005). 
 141. Watson, 2005 WL 1266686, at *2. 
 142. FLA. STAT. § 456.001(6). 
 143. Watson, 2005 WL 1266686, at *2. 
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It is important to note that this decision was made after HIPAA 
came into full effect. It appears, then, that there are at least some 
grounds for the ex parte interviewing of paramedics and EMTs. 
However, the Watson opinion makes no mention of HIPAA.144 In 
addition, while the Florida statute is similar to HIPAA, HIPAA’s 
regulatory scheme does not rely on a list of licensing statutes for 
inclusion as a “health care provider,” but rather on its own included 
definitions. Therefore, while Watson provides a possible argument 
that emergency response personnel are not “health care providers,” 
especially under Florida law, the statutory text indicates that they will 
be treated as such.145 
B. Emergency Response Personnel Should Not Be Subject  
to HIPAA’s Regulatory Scheme 
Despite the fact that under HIPAA’s language paramedics and 
EMTs are subject to the same discovery limitations as physicians, 
emergency response personnel should be excluded from some of 
HIPAA’s regulations, including the prohibition against ex parte 
interviews.146 For instance, if the legislative history had no indication 
of its applicability to ex parte interviews with physicians,147 a debated 
practice among the various jurisdictions, it seems even less likely that 
Congress intended to eliminate ex parte interviews in a context in 
which they had been almost universally accepted. Another simple 
reason for treating emergency response personnel differently is the 
 
 144. Id. 
 145. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d(4) (2005). 
 146. While this Comment focuses on ex parte interviews, the application of HIPAA to 
emergency responders has been shown to be problematic in other contexts, as shown by the 
following anecdote: 
   On June 9, 2003, two months after the new Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) took effect, a Colorado man lay dying of a heart attack 
in his rural backyard. Neighbors trying to aid the man watched helplessly as an 
ambulance passed his house, according to a newspaper report. The ambulance 
crisscrossed the area, with paramedics stopping to ask how to find the man’s address. 
Following western Colorado custom, neighbors didn’t know how to give directions 
based on an address. Give us a name, they said, and we’ll tell you where to go. But 
under their interpretation of the new HIPAA privacy regulations, the paramedics 
refused to release any information that would identify the man. The man died in his 
yard, although officials do not know if paramedics could have saved him had they 
found him earlier.  
Morantz, supra note 11, at 479 (as reported in Parker, supra note 10, at A1). 
 147. Conning the IADC Newsletters, supra note 30, at 211. 
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difference between the nature of an EMT’s or a paramedic’s 
responsibilities and those of a personal physician. Despite the fact 
that emergency responders can be lumped into a nebulous definition 
of “health care providers”—most likely unintentionally—it seems 
obvious that EMTs and paramedics do not fill the same role as a 
physician. The policy reasons behind HIPAA’s restrictions on 
informal discovery are weaker when applied to emergency response 
personnel. 
1. EMTs and paramedics generally do not maintain physician-patient 
relationships 
Perhaps the strongest argument made in support of HIPAA’s 
prohibition of informal discovery is that such a rule protects the 
physician-patient relationship; but in an emergency responder 
context, there is no legally protected relationship.148 HIPAA protects 
personally identifiable health information and strengthens the 
physician-patient relationship by insulating doctors from situations in 
which an improper disclosure may occur.149 But as previously pointed 
out, there is no common law basis for the physician-patient 
privilege,150 much less for an EMT-patient privilege. And until a 
legislature determines to create a firefighter-patient or paramedic-
patient privilege, it does not exist. For that reason, policies created to 
protect the physician-patient privilege are wrongly applied in the 
emergency responder context. 
And there are other reasons for limiting restrictions on ex parte 
interviews to a person’s physicians. For instance, patients are much 
less likely to have the opportunity to choose their emergency 
response personnel as they are to pick a physician. Contact with an 
EMT or paramedic is more likely to be the result of a random 
assignment or of the proximity or availability of the responder 
relative to other responders. And even if a patient was given a choice 
in an emergency, the very fact that it is an emergency makes it highly 
unlikely that the patient would have or express a preference.  
In addition, patients do not seek out paramedics in order to 
disclose an ailment or seek consultation. Emergency medical 
personnel are sent out based on availability in order to deal with 
 
 148. See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 230 F.R.D. 473, 476–77 (E.D. La. 2005). 
 149. See Wirtes et al., supra note 109, at 10–14. 
 150. Smith, supra note 35, at 247. 
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injuries or emergency situations that have just arisen. Therefore, 
there is virtually no need for a patient to develop a confidential 
relationship with an emergency responder. By nature, a paramedic-
patient relationship is less confidential than a physician-patient 
relationship. Of course, an emergency responder might ask about 
allergies, illnesses, current medication, or consumption of alcohol or 
drugs. The answers to such questions might be information the 
patient would like to keep secret. Yet negative answers to those 
questions would likely not be embarrassing, and in most instances, 
positive answers would be made at issue the moment the patient 
decided to file a lawsuit based on that incident. Therefore, the 
chilling effect on patient disclosure that would occur if physicians did 
not maintain confidentiality is not as great of a concern in an 
emergency context. 
2. EMTs and paramedics are less likely to be harmed by informal 
discovery 
While physicians suffer from liability and confidentiality concerns 
in the context of ex parte interviews,151 emergency response 
personnel are less likely to face these concerns. Currently, an EMT or 
paramedic has neither the pressures of a confidential relationship nor 
the potential for improper disclosure that a physician faces. Of 
course, applying HIPAA regulations to them would change that fact, 
but even so, HIPAA’s application would not be enough to create a 
statutory privilege. And while a physician in an ex parte interview 
runs the risk of inadvertently disclosing information that is unrelated 
to the lawsuit, an EMT or paramedic in the same interview is less 
likely to reveal unrelated information for the simple reason that they 
possess little of such information. There could be instances in which 
the paramedic has repeatedly responded to emergencies involving the 
same individual, in which case they might possess information 
irrelevant to the present lawsuit, but those cases would be rare. 
Because emergency responders have less information to keep private 
in an interview, it is likely that they would have an easier time 
keeping it private. And most importantly, even if a paramedic did 
share private information, he or she would not be subject to liability 
on the basis of the violation of a statutory privilege, because there is 
no privilege in place. 
 
 151. See Wirtes et al., supra note 109, at 10. 
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3. Arguments about information loss have a real basis in an emergency 
context 
In addition, some arguments that have proven ineffective with 
respect to allowing ex parte interviews of physicians make more sense 
when applied to the question of interviews with paramedics and 
EMTs. Defense attorneys have argued that there is more information 
available through an ex parte interview than through formal 
discovery procedures.152 Some courts have rejected these arguments 
in the context of physician interviews,153 but there are some key 
considerations that make the argument more reasonable in the case 
of emergency medical personnel. 
For example, a physician typically keeps detailed medical records 
for each of his or her patients, and when litigation arises this is often 
the information a defense attorney is seeking. The information an 
emergency responder possesses is usually the result of responding to 
an accident scene or other event, and thus will almost always include 
more than health information. In fact, a paramedic or EMT will 
commonly be sought out by defense counsel less for the plaintiff’s 
health information, and more for their observations of an accident 
scene or the chronology of events. Firefighters and paramedics tend 
to be among the first to arrive at an accident scene, and thus can 
become essential fact witnesses. The very nature of the job places an 
emergency response person in a position to testify about more than 
just the medical condition of an individual. 
Because an emergency responder does not usually have a 
recurring relationship with a patient, the paramedic’s or EMT’s 
recollection of a particular person is almost sure to fade quickly. In 
addition, while there may be some record kept of any health-related 
procedures, an EMT or paramedic may only record the bare 
minimum, while other observations regarding the accident scene or 
the patient’s condition will be lost through the normal fading of 
memory.154 When a defense attorney’s main purpose is to discover 
any material facts that a paramedic may have observed, HIPAA’s 
application would foil this purpose by delaying discovery until after 
relevant details may have faded from memory. And while there is no 
direct indication of HIPAA’s purpose to this end, HIPAA bases the 
 
 152. Russ, supra note 2, at 29–31. 
 153. Petrillo v. Syntex Labs., Inc., 499 N.E.2d 952, 956 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986). 
 154. See supra note 4. 
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delay solely on the concern that the paramedic may possess health-
related information (or even more unfortunately, because the 
emergency responder’s job description falls within HIPAA’s 
statutory definition). 
Were HIPAA applied as strictly to EMTs or paramedics as it is to 
plaintiffs’ physicians, defense attorneys would find that useful 
information would be lost to them in almost every instance. Despite 
one court’s statement that “ex parte conferences yield no greater 
evidence” than formal discovery,155 there is an obvious difference 
between the amount of information that can be retrieved from an 
EMT or paramedic shortly after an incident and the amount 
retrievable in a deposition that takes place two or three years later. 
Yet under HIPAA’s definitions, there is no distinction made between 
one type of “health care provider” and another,156 leaving EMTs and 
paramedics subject to the same discovery restrictions as a personal 
physician. The slight possibility that some health information 
(information most likely related to the litigation) may be released, or 
the fact that emergency response personnel are technically “health 
care providers” under HIPAA’s definitions,157 are not compelling 
reasons for denying a defense attorney the opportunity to retrieve 
this essential information. 
V. CONCLUSION 
HIPAA’s privacy regulations were created in order to allow 
patients to exert greater control over their private health 
information. The majority of the courts have interpreted these 
provisions, however, as also removing informal discovery procedures 
from the arsenal of the litigator. A defense attorney may no longer 
conduct an ex parte interview of a plaintiff’s physician unless, at the 
minimum, HIPAA’s strict procedures for formal discovery are 
adhered to. While some attorneys have complained that HIPAA has 
thus handicapped their ability to perform defense work, there are 
some compelling reasons for HIPAA’s statutory scheme, and in all 
likelihood it will continue. Protection of the physician-patient 
relationship and the integrity of the civil justice system are concerns 
 
 155. Russ, supra note 2, at 31 (citing Petrillo v. Syntex Labs., Inc., 499 N.E.2d 952, 956 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1986)). 
 156. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2005). 
 157. Id. 
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that lie at the heart of HIPAA’s apparent aversion to informal 
discovery. 
On the other hand, the role of emergency response personnel 
such as EMTs and paramedics differs in many ways from that of 
physicians, and although emergency responders are included in 
HIPAA’s definition of a “health care provider,” such personnel 
should be permitted greater freedom than that allowed by HIPAA’s 
current regulatory scheme. Some of the interests that support 
restricting the ability to conduct ex parte interviews with a plaintiff’s 
physician may still exist in the context of emergency response 
personnel, but those that remain are significantly weaker. At the 
same time, the arguments offered in support of ex parte interviews—
largely ineffectual when applied in the physician context—are 
stronger when made in the emergency responder context. Allowing 
defense attorneys the opportunity to conduct ex parte interviews 
with EMTs and paramedics would be of great benefit to a defendant 
without damaging the relationships and privileges that HIPAA is 
designed to protect. 
In order to prevent or mitigate HIPAA’s chilling effect on ex 
parte interviews of emergency response personnel, in order to 
provide defense counsel with the tools and information necessary to 
best serve their clients, and in light of the complete lack of indicia in 
the legislative history of any intent to limit contact with EMTs and 
paramedics, HIPAA’s restrictions on informal discovery should not 
be applied to emergency responders. 
Daniel M. Roche 
 
